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Abstract
More than one-third of all public high school students, majority being boys
and blacks, dropout of school each year. This has put the question of how to
spend educational resources in a cost-effective way prominent on the research
agenda. In this paper, we study the effect of a large scale and low cost negative
incentive policy, the No Pass No Drive (NPND) law, on education outcomes.
Since the late 1980s, several U.S. states have introduced these laws that set
minimum academic requirements for teenagers to obtain driving licenses. Using
data from the American Community Survey (ACS) and Monitoring the Future
(MTF), we exploit variation across state, time, and cohort to show that NPND
laws led to a 6.4 percentage point increase in the probability of graduating from
high school among black males. Further, we show that NPND laws were effective
in reducing truancy and increased time allocated to school-work at the expense
of leisure and work.
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Educators and policy makers are increasingly paying more attention towards one of
America’s most disturbing educational trend: more than one-third of all public high
school students fail to graduate with their class.1 Dropout rates are particularly high
among boys and blacks. This phenomenon has been termed the “silent epidemic”
and has forced states to take several initiatives to keep students in school. Among
the different interventions that have been introduced, much attention has been paid
recently to the use of performance-based cash or in-kind rewards to motivate students
to stay in school and improve academic achievement. Large scale financial incentive
programs have been evaluated in the U.S. and worldwide.2 Most of these studies
advocate for financial incentives or carrots as a more direct and cost-effective way to
improve student outcomes compared to traditional input-oriented initiatives (e.g., more
teachers, higher teacher salaries, smaller class sizes, improving school infrastructure
etc.). Furthermore, many of these studies find that girls respond better to financial
incentives compared to boys.
As opposed to positive incentives, policies that impose a penalty on under per-
forming students are not so popular among educators and policy makers because they
decrease the set of choices available to children. Moreover, for researchers, there are
ethical issues involved in conducting randomized controlled trials that would penalize
one group of students. The existing literature on negative incentives at the secondary
school level has mostly focussed on the effects of high school exit exams on dropout
rates. However, the evidence is inconclusive and several of the studies find that exit
exams causes some groups of students to drop out of school early.3
In this paper, we study the effect of a large scale and low cost negative incentive
policy, the No Pass No Drive (NPND) law, on education outcomes. We argue that
negative incentives, when not too extreme and when targeted towards an activity that
students have a preference for, might be an effective means to improve educational
1Swanson, Christopher B. (2004). “Who Graduates? Who Doesn’t? A Statistical Portrait of
Public High School Graduation”, Class of 2001. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute
2Some recent examples include Angrist and Lavy (2009), Angrist et al. (2009), Berry (2009),
Bettinger (2010), Fryer (2010), Kremer, et al. (2009) and Leuven, Oosterbeek, and van der Klaauw
(2010).
3See Lindo, Sanders and Oreopoulos (2010) for a brief review of this literature.
2
outcomes. Moreover, the beneficial effects are most pronounced for disadvantaged
groups who are also at high risk of dropping out.
Since the late 1980s, many U.S. states have set restrictions for teenagers to have
access to a drivers’license. Students must continually earn their driving privileges by
staying in school and, in some states, passing their courses. The regulation is intended
to motivate academically marginal students, who enjoy the freedom associated with
driving, to work harder or, to stay, in school. These laws, commonly known as No
Pass No Drive (NPND) laws, vary across states in their scope. While most states
require the applicant to be enrolled in, attending school, and/or condition license on
courses passed, some states deny or revoke driving licenses to minors who are involved
in unacceptable behavior such as possession of illegal substances or violent behavior.
The implementation of NPND laws imposes a minimal cost to the state. School atten-
dance offi cers monitor truant students and send an electronic notification to the traffi c
authority, which then denies or revokes the students’driving licenses.
As an example, Kentucky implemented the NPND legislation in August 2007. Ac-
cording to the state statute, “When a sixteen or seventeen year old student drops out of
school or is declared to be academically deficient, the schools will report electronically
to the Division of Driver Licensing. The Division of Driver Licensing will suspend
the student’s privilege to drive and notify the driver of the suspension” (KRS 159.051).
Similarly, Florida implemented the NPND law in 1997 in an attempt to reduce truancy
and improve academic performance. In 2010, the state suspended 5,389 students’li-
censes for truancy, and sent warnings to another 24,090 students with learner’s permit
who were at risk for a delay in getting their license.4
The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we study the effect of a negative incentive
policy on long run education outcomes. On the one hand, imposing minimum academic
requirements can increase education by motivating students who want to gain driving
privileges to do better in school. On the other hand, if a student drives to school
or to work, taking away his driving privileges might in fact compel him to drop-out
from school. We use data from the 2009 U.S. American Community Survey (ACS) to
compare the academic outcomes of treated cohorts who were young enough to have
been affected by the NPND laws to older cohorts in the same state, relative to other
control states in the sample. Our results indicate that NPND laws have a significantly
large effect on education outcomes among boys and blacks, but not girls. In particular,
4Source: Data tracked by the Florida Department of Motor Vehicles in cooperation with the Florida
Department of Education.
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it led to a 2.7 percentage point increase in average educational attainment among black
males and a 6.4 percentage point increase in the probability of graduating from high
school.
Second, we study the channel through which NPND policy has an effect on edu-
cation. In particular, if this policy changes time invested in education, it should also
affect allocation of time between leisure and work. We use a differences-in-differences
approach with repeated cross-sectional data of high school students from the Moni-
toring the Future (MTF) survey to confirm changes in time allocation that led to an
increase in education. We find that NPND laws were effective in reducing truancy and
increased time allocated to homework, mainly among blacks, at the expense of leisure
and employment activities. Moreover, in states with NPND laws, students who are
enrolled in school are more likely to drive and hold a driver’s license. Intuitively, we
should expect NPND laws to have a larger effect on individuals who have a preference
for driving and are at the margin between dropping out of school or not. Both Census
and MTF results are robust to several checks to internal validity threats.
There are several policy implications of our results. First, the dropout rates are
alarmingly high among disadvantaged groups and the optimal policy must target such
groups. Our results confirm that the law was indeed effective in increasing educational
attainment among black males. Second, in addition to having direct implications on the
labor market through higher wages, the increase in education also generates positive
externalities on the rest of the society. For example, Lochner and Moretti (2004)
estimate that 23% of the difference in incarceration rates between blacks and whites
could be eliminated by raising the average education levels of blacks to the same level
as that of whites. Comparably, if education increases one’s patience or risk aversion, we
might also expect more educated individuals to be safer drivers. Third, the increase in
years of completed education is especially striking when one considers that the cost to
the state of imposing this policy is minimal. Fourth, this policy might also be effective
in narrowing the college gender gap. Our results suggest that NPND laws led to an
increase in average educational attainment among males but not females.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section discusses the
background and literature pertinent to our study. Section 3 describes the data used
in the analysis and presents the empirical strategy. In Section 4 we show the main
results. Finally, we conclude the discussion in Section 5.
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2 Background
2.1 No Pass No Drive Laws
In 1988, West Virginia became the first state in North America to revoke or deny driving
privileges to teenagers who do not show satisfactory progress in school. Following the
success of the law in West Virginia, several other states have implemented policies that
link driver licenses to school attendance, academic performance, and/or behavior. We
compiled data on NPND laws from state legal statutes for the period 1988 to 2008.
As of 2008, 26 states have passed NPND laws and most states implemented it in the
1990’s. The shaded states in Figure 1 had the law in place in the most recent year in
our sample.
Implementation of the law requires an integrated effort between the State Depart-
ment of Education, Department of Public Safety and Division of Driver’s Licensing.
When a sixteen or seventeen year old goes to the Division of Driver’s Licensing to
obtain a driving permit or license, a School Compliance Verification Form has to be
presented verifying that the student is in compliance with the specific requirements of
the law. The students may obtain the School Compliance Verification Form from their
school district of residence. In some states, such as Kentucky and Florida, schools
electronically report changes to their students’ statuses to the licensing authorities.
The online service is provided free of charge and imposes no cost to either the state
governments or the taxpayers.5 In most other states, whenever a student withdraws
from school, is found to be academically deficient, or has excessive absences, the law
requires the attendance offi cer to notify the Department of Public Safety. Following
the receipt of this notice, the Department of Public Safety sends a notice to the licensee
that he is at risk of losing his driving license unless documentation of compliance with
the law is received.
Data collected by some of the state departments suggests that the law is strictly
enforced. The southern states of Florida, Georgia, Kentucky and Tennessee together
suspended more than 20,000 licenses in 2009-2010 alone for attendance related viola-
tions. The number of notices issued for intent to suspend driving privileges was more
than three times the actual licenses suspended.6 Historically also there is some anec-
dotal evidence that these laws have been strictly enforced and have been effective in
5Source: Kentucky Department of Education and Department of Transportation
6Source: Southern Regional Education Board (SREB)
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keeping students in school. For example, a 1990 newspaper article stated:
“West Virginia adopted the nation’s first such law in 1988. So far, more than 1,000
licenses have been revoked. Of that number, 583 were reinstated- 163 because youngsters
returned to school, 172 because youths turned 18 and 77 because of “circumstances
beyond the control”of the students.
In Florida, a report on the first four months of the law’s use shows that 1,000 of the
4,200 dropouts who returned to school between October 1989 and February 1990 cited
the law as the reason” (Kentucky New Era—May 22, 1990)
The intent of the law is unanimous across states: students who fail to meet manda-
tory attendance requirements cannot apply for a driver’s license. However, they can
earn the right to seek a license by returning to school, qualifying for an exemption
related to personal or professional circumstances or attaining the eligible age, i.e. 18
in most states. Some states also require that students meet certain academic expecta-
tions in addition to attendance. As shown in Table 1, among these 26 states, seventeen
condition a student’s driving privilege exclusively on compliance with attendance re-
quirements. For the remaining states, other factors are also taken into account such as
satisfactory academic progress and suspension or expulsion from school. Table 1 also
shows that the minimum age at which the individual is bound by the law is 15 for a
majority of the states. In most cases, the law is applicable until the individual turns
18.
2.2 Related Literature
The effect of carrots or positive incentives on education outcomes have been well doc-
umented and debated. Among social scientists the popular view for over 30 years
has been that cash incentives destroy intrinsic motivation to learn (Deci, Koestner, &
Ryan, 1999; Frey and Jegen, 2001). Contrary to this extreme view, recent empirical
work in economics of education has shown heterogeneity in the effect of rewards on
individuals. While some students improve their outcomes in response to incentives,
others are either not affected or are worse off.
Leuven, Oosterbeek, and van der Klaauw (2010) evaluate a randomized experi-
ment on the effects of financial incentives on undergraduate students’achievement in
University of Amsterdam. They find that high-ability students have larger pass rates
and more credit points when assigned to reward groups. In contrast, the achievement
of low-ability students drops when assigned to larger reward groups. Angrist, Lang,
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and Oreopolous (2009) evaluate the effects of financial rewards linked to Grade Point
Average (GPA) performance in a Canadian university. They find that financial in-
centives improve performance among female students but not among males. This is
consistent with an Israeli study by Angrist and Lavy (2009) who find a positive effect
on matriculation rates among girls, but not boys, who were provided cash incentives to
complete a matriculation certificate. Bettinger (2010) finds more direct evidence that
incentives, where students could receive upto $100, did not lower measures of intrinsic
motivation among elementary-school students in a low-income section of Ohio. In large
scale randomized trials done in four U.S. cities, Fryer (2010) shows that incentives that
are linked to inputs (such as attendance, homework, good behavior, etc.) lead to an
improvement in student achievement. In comparison, incentives that are conditional
on performance are much less effective. This study gave financial incentives worth $6.3
million to 38,000 students across 261 schools. In a summary of the literature relevant
to the U.S., Gneezy, Meier and Rey-Biel (2011) point out that the program effects of
large scale financial incentive schemes are relatively small in size compared to the costs
incurred. Overall, the results suggest that the use of large scale financial incentives in
education is not very cost effective.
Our study adds to this growing body of literature that evaluates incentive programs.
We argue that if NPND laws lead to a decrease in truancy, increases time allocated
to studying without penalizing work activities and reduces dropout rates, then this
policy will produce better outcomes than financial incentive programs and at lower
cost to the public. Moreover, the policy would be most effective if the benefits accrue
to disadvantaged groups who are at a higher risk of dropping out or being habitual
truants.
This paper also contributes to the literature on the effect of sticks on student
outcomes. Policies that impose a penalty on under performing students are not so
popular among educators and policy makers because they decrease the set of choices
available to children. Moreover, for researchers, there are ethical issues involved in
conducting randomized controlled trials that would penalize one group of students.
In a study of Canadian college students, Lindo, Sanders, and Oreopoulus (2009)
find that being placed on academic probation —the student must earn a GPA above the
campus-set standard in the next term or he will be suspended from the university for
one year —more than doubles the probability that Canadian males drop out of college
but no such discouragement effect is found for female college students. Another typical
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form of negative incentive is to require students to improve their performance in order
to gain a particular privilege. Vidal-Fernández (2011) analyzes state interscholastic
associations rules imposed during the 1970s in the U.S. that required student athletes
to pass a certain number of subjects in order to be allowed to participate in school
sports. Using women as a placebo group, she finds that a one-subject increase in the
minimum academic standard is associated with a two-percentage-point increase in the
probability of high school graduation.7
We contribute to the literature on negative incentives in atleast two ways. First,
we evaluate the effect of a negative policy that targets driving; an activity that is
considered an integral aspect of maturation and socialization process among teenagers.
If a student does not want to be in school in the first place, placing him/her on probation
is only going to make it easier for him to drop out. On the other hand, if the stakes
are related to an activity that students enjoy or consider important, the policy might
be effective. In other words, negative incentives would be most effective if they target
an activity that students have a preference for, such as driving.
Second, unlike the policies analyzed in Lindo et. at (2009) and Vidal-Fernández
(2011), the effect of NPND laws on education outcomes is arguably homogeneous within
subgroups. Generally speaking, penalizing students for not meeting academic stan-
dards can raise or lower high school graduation rates. On the one hand, academically
marginal students who want to stay in college (or, play high school sports) may be
motivated to work harder to remain in college (or, on the school sports team). On
the other hand, some students will simply “give-up”because the utility cost associated
with the extra academic effort exceeds the benefits of staying in college (or, getting
to play high school sports). If the second effect dominates the first, graduation rates
might actually decline as a state adds another course requirement to the minimum aca-
demic standards —clearly opposite the regulations’intention. Therefore, the stricter is
the minimum academic requirement, the less likely we are to find a positive impact on
graduation rates.
However, NPND laws do not affect the utility of staying in school, but instead, they
make the outside option of dropping out less attractive if students have a preference
for driving. Therefore, it is not so obvious why NPND laws should negatively affect
dropout rates. One could argue that there may still be atleast two reasons why the
law could make some students dropout. First, some students with low attendance,
7A key limitation of this paper is that if men and women are affected differentially by unobserved
factors in states with sports restrictions, the identification strategy is questionable.
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who generally drive to school, may no longer be able to attend school if they lose
their driving privileges after the implementation of the law. Second, some individuals,
particularly those who come from low income families, may drop out of school if the
law imposes financial burdens (mainly due to a decrease in hours spent working).
Though we do not have the required data to test this directly, we do not expect that
NPND laws would have such negative effects on dropout rates or work activities. This
is because, in most states, students can appeal for an exemption based on personal or
professional reasons. For instance, students in Kentucky, Louisiana and West Virginia
can apply for economic hardship exemptions if they need to drive to jobs that support
their families. Similarly, Mississippi allows students under 18 to be exempt if they are
married. A few states also allow students to drive if they are enrolled in job training
or need to drive to GED certificate programs.
3 Data and Empirical Framework
3.1 American Community Survey
To study the effect of NPND laws on education outcomes, we use data from the 2009
round of the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey (ACS). We match
data from the ACS with information on state level minimum and maximum age re-
quirements to identify cohorts that were affected by the NPND law in the year in which
the law was enacted. For the analysis on high school graduation rates, the birth cohorts
examined span from 1958 to 1990. We do this to ensure that the youngest individual
in our sample is at least 19 years old and has completed high school (i.e. someone born
in 1990). This also ensures that the oldest individual was 30 years old when the first
law was passed in 1988 (i.e. someone born in 1958). For the analysis on completed
years of schooling, we restrict the sample to those individuals who are at least 24 years
old. Therefore, the sample consists of cohorts born between 1957 and 1985.
Our baseline specification to study the effect of NPND laws on education outcomes
is given by,
Eisc = β1Treatmentsc + β2Xisc + β3Rsc + S +B + εisc (1)
Where, the outcome E is measured by years of completed education and high
school graduation. Treatmentsc is a dummy variable indicating whether the individual
9
belongs to the treated cohort c in state of birth s. Treatmentsc is equal to 1 for all
individuals who were younger than 13 in the year the law was passed. We chose age
13 because it is the youngest age at which teenagers are eligible for drivers license in
our data (see Table 1). The control group (Treatmentsc = 0) are those individuals
who were older than 18 when a law was passed in their state. Individuals between
the ages of 14 to 18 in the year the law was passed are omitted from the sample
because we cannot identify to what extent they would have been affected by the law.8
S and B refer to state of birth and year of birth fixed effects, Xisc includes controls for
gender, race and Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA). Rsc includes a set
of state-specific demographic (log population), economic (log per capita income and
unemployment rate), and education controls (log of per pupil expenditure, the pupil
teacher ratio and log of teacher salary)9 associated with the birth cohort at age 13. All
income and expenditure variables are inflation adjusted.
We merge data on NPND laws with the census data using state of birth identi-
fier. Using state of birth instead of state of residence avoids any bias that may be
introduced due to career-induced migration. Standard errors are clustered at the state
level (Bertrand, Duflo & Mullainathan, 2004). The entire sample consists of 1,059,305
observations including states that never passed NPND laws.
Our coeffi cient of interest, β1, in this specification is identified using cross-state
and cross-cohort variation. For instance, in California, where law was adopted in 1991,
Treatmentsc=1 for those born between 1978 and 1990 and Treatmentsc=0 for those
born before 1972. The second difference is to individuals of the same birth cohort in
other states in the sample that did not have NPND laws at the time.
The crucial identifying assumption is that education outcomes do not vary system-
atically across cohorts in the treatment and control states over time. There could be
potential internal validity threats to this conventional identification assumption. First,
if education outcomes were reacting to other laws that were being implemented around
the same time, our estimates would be biased. Second, there could be mean reversion if
there was a downward trend in educational attainment in treatment states at the time
of the enactment of the NPND laws but not in control states. Third, the intervention
8The treatment status of individuals between the age of 14 to 18 cannot be clearly ascertained.
The appendix presents an alternative specification including 14-18 and where the Treatment is the
number of years exposed to the policy. Our main conclusion from the paper hold with the inclusion
of 14 to 18 year olds in this alternative specification.
9All state level education data has been obtained from the National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES).
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could be a response to another factor that simultaneously influences both the policy
and outcome. Besley and Case (2000) point out the importance of controlling for such
policy endogeneity. For instance, the sudden increase in teen accident fatality rates or
traffi c violations could lead to states passing NPND laws. One could argue that due to
the increased accident rates, parents forbid their children from driving to school and
that in turn influences their allocation of time and education outcomes.
To account for these factors, we check for threats to internal validity in several ways.
First, we present evidence on the robustness of our key results to introducing a rich
set of state-specific demographic, economic, and education controls. To address the
issue of policy endogeneity caused by traffi c related outcomes, we run a version of the
baseline regressions controlling for two additional state level traffi c control variables:
the log of vehicle miles traveled and the log of total motor vehicle fatalities among 15-17
year olds. Third, we include state-specific linear time trends in the regressions. Fourth,
we directly test if our results are being driven by other laws that were being passed in
states around the same time as NPND laws. We focus on minimum school entrance
age laws and compulsory attendance laws. Finally, we run placebo regressions among
older cohorts who were not directly affected by the NPND laws. If the identification
strategy is valid, we should find that NPND laws have no effect on education outcomes
of older cohorts.
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for key variables used in the baseline
specification. The average educational attainment in the sample is 13.5 years with a
high school graduation rate of 87 percent.10 As expected, females have higher education
levels than males. State expenditures per pupil have increased over time whereas pupil
teacher ratios have decreased. Teacher salaries have not changed much since the 1960’s.
If teenage students allocate their time between attending school, working and
leisure, an increase in time spent on attending school or studying should be accompa-
nied by a decrease either in work hours, leisure or both. To support and complement
the ACS findings, we use data from the 1993-2008 rounds of Monitoring the Future
(MTF) surveys to analyze how NPND laws affect young adults’allocation of time and
driving outcomes. The next subsection describes this data in detail.
10We treat GEDs as high school dropouts following Heckman and LaFontaine (2010)
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3.2 Monitoring the Future (MTF)
The MTF surveys approximately 50,000 12th graders across 135 schools every year since
1975 and 8th and 10th graders since 1991.11 The survey is meant to identify changes in
young adults’views, attitudes, and behaviors overtime. Though the primary purpose of
MTF is to gather information on substance abuse by teens, the data also contain useful
information on teens’allocation of time. In addition, it includes basic demographic
information such as age, sex, race, and parents’education.
The MTF collects data on the average time per week or per day spent on a range
of activities including work, going out with friends, watching TV, sports or exercise,
reading books and homework. For our study, we focus on survey questions that indicate
the channels through which NPND laws might affect the allocation of time between
educational investment, work, and leisure. For instance, the MTF asks respondents
whether they work and the number of hours they work. We use this variable to study
the effect of NPND laws on allocation of time towards work. The survey also asks
respondents how often they go out for parties or on dates, play sports, watch TV etc.
We use these variables to proxy for leisure activities. We also test if NPND laws have an
effect on time invested in education activities. We use the time spent doing homework
and the probability of skipping school as proxies for investment in education. Finally,
to further support our results, we also look at the effect of NPND on driving outcomes
in the MTF.
Table 3 presents the outcome variables and demographic characteristics by gender
and race. There are no statistically significant differences by race or gender in the
background characteristics. However, we can see some interesting differences in the
choices made. For instance, consistent with a broad literature on gender differences
in academic achievement, in our sample, females have a higher Grade Point Average
(GPA) than boys. Also, blacks have lower average GPA than non-blacks. We also
find truancy to be most prominent among blacks. Among the different groups, females
spend the highest amount of time per week doing homework while blacks have the least
hours. When we look at employment, the raw data suggests that boys are slightly more
likely to work than girls. Interestingly, there are no significant differences across the
groups in leisure activities such as going out on dates or to parties. However, blacks
11The MTF survey is self-administered and information that can be used to identify individuals is
held confidential. We came to an agreement with the Survey Research Center at the University of
Michigan who kindly agreed on running our programs on site and provided us with the output tables.
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spend much more time, on an average, watching television on a weekday.
For the MTF, we estimate the following Differences-in-Differences specification
for respondents who were 15-17 years old at the time of the survey (both 10th and 12th
graders) and were, therefore, in the age group that is directly affected by the NPND
law:
Yist = α0 + α1NPNDst + α2Xist + α3Zst + S + T + εist (2)
where i denotes individual, s denotes state, and t refers to time. Y is the outcome
of interest (education, work, leisure and driving). NPND is a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 if state s has the NPND law in place at time t. X is a vector
of individual student characteristics that includes age, maximum parental education,
race, a dummy equal to one if the student lives in a Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area (SMSA), and a male dummy in the full sample models. Zst includes potentially
relevant time-varying state-level controls. These include macroeconomic variables (log
of per-capita income, log of population and unemployment rate), education controls
(log of per-pupil expenditures in education, log of teacher’s salary and the ratio of
pupils per teachers) and traffi c related variables (log of vehicle miles traveled and log
of total motor vehicle fatalities among 15-17 year olds).12 All income and expenditure
variables are inflation-adjusted. S and T are state and time fixed effects, respectively.
Standard errors are clustered at the state levels (Bertrand, Duflo & Mullainathan,
2004).
Our coeffi cient of interest, α1, captures within state changes in students’outcomes
in states where a NPND is enacted with respect to the associated changes in outcomes
of students in states where a law has not yet been enacted. The identifying assumption
is that there are no unobserved changes in variables related to both student outcomes
and NPND laws that are differentially affecting treatment and control states. For
example if NPND laws were enacted together with other traffi c laws affecting teenagers,
we would find a decrease in leisure and in probability of driving for teenagers which
may not entirely be attributed to NPND laws. We carry out robustness checks to
ensure internal validity of our estimates. We introduce education control variables that
affect education and might have changed during the time when the laws were being
12Data on vehicle miles travelled was obtained from the Highway Statistics Series of the Federal
Highway Administration. Statewise annual motor vehicle fatality data are from the Fatality Analysis
Reporting System (FARS) database.
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enacted. Similarly, we include state-specific linear time trends to capture time-varying
unobserved characteristics at the state level.
The effect of NPND laws on allocation of time has to be interpreted carefully for
two reasons. First, time spent on leisure or work may decrease not because individuals
choose to devote more time to study, but because they might not be able to drive to
work or to a party. However, we circumvent this problem by also studying outcomes
that do not require driving, such as, time spent watching TV or doing homework.
Regardless of the reason behind changes to time allocation, if high school graduation
rates increase as a result of the NPND laws, it should be at the expense of either
leisure, work or both.
Second, the MTF is a selected sample of teenagers who have not dropped out from
school. This would be a problem if we want to measure the effect of NPND laws on
allocation of time among teenagers who drop out of school before the law is passed. If
some of them drive to work, we would expect a drop in their work hours after the policy
is implemented. We interpret the MTF results as the effect of the law on allocation of
time among the selected sample of individuals who are attending school.
4 Results
4.1 American Community Survey (2009)
Table 4 shows results for the effect of NPND laws on high school graduation. Column
(1) reports estimates from the sparest specification without any control variables. As
expected, the sign on the treatment variable is negative and should be interpreted as
NPND laws being enacted in states with low graduation rates. However the coeffi cient
switches signs upon including state and cohort fixed effects in column (2). The complete
model in column (3) suggests that NPND laws had a positive and significant effect on
high school graduation rates. In particular, NPND laws are associated with an increase
of 0.9 percent in graduation rates and the effect is significant at 5%. The effect is
slightly larger for boys than for girls. However, given that the graduation rate for girls
is higher than for boys (Table 2), these numbers translate to almost similar percentage
changes in graduation rates for both groups. The specifications in Columns (3)-(5)
include state level macroeconomic controls for unemployment rate, log of per capita
income and log population. As can be seen from comparing columns (2) and (3), the
estimates are robust to inclusion of state macroeconomic and education controls.
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Table 5 shows analogous regression estimates with education attainment as the
outcome variable. Once again, NPND laws led to an increase in education attainment
among cohorts affected. However, unlike the results for high school completion rates,
the effect on educational attainment is only visible for boys and is significant only at
10% level. This is an interesting result because several studies on financial incentives
find that girls react to positive incentives or carrots while boys do not. However, the
results from Table 5 show that the effect of a stick on educational attainment is larger
among boys. This could be either because boys react more than girls to sticks or
because boys have a preference for driving and girls do not.
One of the main concerns in these estimates is that the results may be influenced by
underlying state-specific trends. More importantly, education attainment among girls
has been increasing during the period of study and this could be biasing the results
in Table 5. Since NPND laws vary both by cohorts and by state, we cannot include
state-cohort interactions. Nonetheless, in Table 6 we include state-specific linear time
trends to address this concern.
Columns (1), (2) and (3) show results for educational attainment as the dependent
variable while columns (4) to (6) show results for graduation rates. As suspected, upon
inclusion of state-specific time trends, Table 6 shows that NPND laws have no signif-
icant effect on education outcomes for females. The coeffi cients in columns (3) and
(6) are close to zero and statistically insignificant. Among boys, the treated cohorts
have 0.1 more years of education and are 1.5 percentage point more likely to graduate
from high school. The mean attainment and graduation rates among males is 13.29
years and 0.84 respectively. Thus, as a result of NPND laws, males have 0.8 percent-
age points higher educational attainment and are 1.8 percentage point more likely to
graduate from high school. As expected, the effect on average educational attainment
is smaller relative to high school graduation rates. This is because the law would have
the largest effect on marginal students who are at the risk of dropping out, and these
students are least likely to invest in higher levels of education.
Since black youths constitute a disproportionately large proportion of dropout pop-
ulation, and NPND targets teens at risk of dropping out, we should expect a larger
effect for this subgroup.13 Table 7 presents the estimates from separate regressions by
race among males.
13We only report results for males by race. In similar regressions for females, as expected from
results shown in Table 6, none of the estimates were significant at conventional levels. These results
are available upon request.
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Black cohorts affected by the NPND law have 0.34 more years of education and
are almost 5.1% more likely to graduate from high school. This is a large effect and
translates to a 2.7 percentage point increase in average educational attainment among
black males (the mean education for this group is 12.53 years) and a 6.4 percentage
point increase in the probability of graduating from high school (mean graduation is
0.73). Taken together, the results suggest that the law had the largest effect on males
and in particular among disadvantaged groups.
4.2 Robustness Checks
4.2.1 Minimum School Entry Laws and Compulsory Attendance Laws
A potential concern with our identification strategy is that education outcome may
be affected by other unobserved education policies that were also changing around the
same time as NPND laws. One policy that has received a lot of attention recently
is the minimum school entry age laws. In the 1960s children were allowed to start
kindergarten when they were considerably less than five years old. However, over the
last four decades, there has been a shift in policy and most states have increased the
minimum entrance age. If school entry age laws changed around the same time as
NPND laws, our results would not correctly capture the effect of NPND laws. This
is even more relevant because the literature finds that older children tend to perform
better in school and complete more years of schooling (Barua and Lang, 2010).
To address this concern, we estimate the regressions controlling for the minimum
age at which the state allows the child to enroll in kindergarten. For instance, if a
state law requires that the child must turn 5 by 1st September, the youngest child
in kindergarten in that state would be 60 months old (assuming school starts on 1st
September). Similarly, if the state law requires the child to turn 5 by December 1st, the
youngest entrant to kindergarten would be 4 years and 9 months old (i.e. 57 months).
Using state of birth as the identifier, we merge census data with school entry age laws
that were in place in the year all individuals in our sample turned 5.
Table 8, Columns (3) and (4), show results for the effect of NPND laws on edu-
cational attainment and graduation rates, respectively, controlling for the minimum
school entry age (in months). We only present estimates among males (shown in panel
A) and black males (shown in panel B), the group that is most affected by the policy.14
14Regressions for women and the entire sample also yield estimates that do not change with inclusion
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Columns (1) and (2) reproduce results from table 6 and table 7 for education outcomes
among males and black males. The inclusion of the entry age variable has a small effect
on the NPND coeffi cient for both education outcome variables for males. The effect on
attainment drops marginally and is now significant at 5%. However, the coeffi cient on
entry age variable is close to zero and statistically insignificant. Including minimum
entry age makes the coeffi cient on black males (panel B) even larger and the estimates
are still highly significant. The effect on graduation is now 0.074 which translates to a
10 percentage point increase in graduation rates among black males.
In columns (5) and (6) we include as an additional variable the Compulsory Atten-
dance Law (CAL) that was in place in the year the individual turned 14.15 If there
were state compulsory education laws that were being changed around the same time
as the NPND laws, we may get an upward biased estimate. As we would expect, con-
trolling for CALs does not change either the magnitude or the significance of estimates
(the only exception is a marginal loss of significance on the coeffi cient on graduation
among males in column (6)). When we look at column (6), we find that CALs have a
statistically significant and positive effect on graduation rates among males. The small
coeffi cient on CALs is consistent with Angrist and Krueger (1991) who find that the
effect of these laws declined after 1940’s possibly because of the increased desire for
education among recent cohorts. Between 1975 and 2010, the high school completion
rate for Blacks increased from 71 to 90 percent, and the gap between Blacks andWhites
decreased from 15 to 5 percentage points.16 Thus, it is not surprising that CALs are
less of a constraint among Blacks than Whites for recent cohorts.
4.2.2 Placebo Tests
As an additional internal validity test, we use a “fake”treatment group to see if ed-
ucation outcomes are reacting to any other factors that affect different cohorts in a
particular way. Individuals who were more than 19 years old at the time of the en-
actment of the NPND law should not be affected by these laws. Not only are most
of these individuals out of school but also they are above the maximum age at which
the NPND law is applicable. We estimate a placebo model where the “treatment”
group includes individuals who are between 19 and 24 years of age and the “control”
group comprises of individuals between ages 25 to 30. If the regression estimate is
of entry age variable.
15We kindly thank Philip Oreopoulos for providing us with the data on CALs.
16Source: U.S. Department of Education, Digest of Education Statistics (2010).
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significantly different from 0 for the placebo groups, the trends are not parallel, and
our original estimate is likely to be biased. As we can see in columns (7) and (8) in
table 8, for both males and blacks, the coeffi cient on NPND for the placebo groups
is close to zero and statistically insignificant. However, the coeffi cient in column (7)
on black males is non trivial, though the standard errors are large possibly due to the
small sample size.
4.2.3 Traffi c Related Confounding Factors
Even if other policies are not confounding our estimates, the policy intervention could
be a response to a third factor that simultaneously influences the policy implementation
and education outcomes. For example, a sudden increase in teen traffi c fatality rates
or traffi c violations could lead to states passing NPND laws. At the same time, due to
the increased accident rates or violations, parents forbid their children from driving to
school and that influences their allocation of time and education outcomes. Moreover,
one can argue that NPND laws will be more effective in states where vehicle usage is
higher due to geographic factors or cultural reasons. Therefore, only states in which
the policy would have been effective apply NPND laws and the outcome depends on
who is being treated.
Table 9 presents results from the ACS with two additional state level traffi c control
variables: the log of vehicle miles traveled and the log of total motor vehicle fatali-
ties among 15-17 year olds. The data on vehicle miles is collected from the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA). The traffi c fatalities data is collected from the Fa-
tality Analysis Reporting System (FARS). To be consistent with the other variables,
we merge this data corresponding to the year the individual turns 13. However, FARS
data is only available since 1975, whereas the oldest cohort in our sample turns 13 in
1971 (i.e. those born in 1958). Thus, table 9 excludes data from 1971 until 1974 and
that explains the difference in number of observations from previous tables.
We show results for the entire sample, males and black males. Upon inclusion of
traffi c variables, the coeffi cients are even larger in magnitude, especially for black males
in column 3 and 6, and are still estimated with a lot of precision. Moreover, in column
5, the coeffi cient on teen traffi c fatalities is negative and significant for the graduation
regression.
Within states, the distinction between urban and rural areas would also be im-
portant. In particular, the effects should not be concentrated in areas with extensive
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public transportation systems since many youths in these areas have no need for drivers’
licenses and therefore should not have been affected by the policy. Cross-state com-
parisons might suffer from these fundamental differences in location related needs to
drive. Though all our regressions control for the metropolitan status, we also estimated
separate regressions by splitting the sample by SMSA. The results are comforting and
show that coeffi cients are larger in magnitude in rural areas and often insignificant in
urban regions.17
Overall, the results strongly suggest that NPND laws did indeed increase educa-
tional attainment and graduation rates among males and blacks in the U.S. Given this
observed shift in time invested in education, how do NPND laws affect work-leisure
time allocation? To address this question and to further support the Census estimates,
in the next section, we show results using data from Monitoring the Future (MTF)
survey.
4.3 Monitoring the Future
In this section, we present results for 15 to 17 year olds from the differences-in-
differences specification given in equation (2). Results are shown for the complete
specification outlined in section 3.3 and includes all individual level control variables,
state/year level education and macroeconomic controls and two traffi c control variables.
To be consistent with the census data, in all the MTF tables shown below, we include
the same set of control variables that we used in the census estimates. However, in
tables not shown in the paper (but available upon request), we have estimated versions
of the baseline model including recent state laws related to driving. Our results are
robust to including Graduated Driver Licensing (GDL) laws and Seatbelt use laws.
All regression estimates shown also include state effects, year effects and state-specific
time trends. For all tables, column (1) shows results for the entire sample, columns (2)
and (3) estimates the model separately by gender while columns (4) and (5) present
estimates by race for blacks and non-blacks respectively.
Table 10 reports estimates with school-related outcomes as the dependent variable.
Panel A shows results for grades, panel B reports estimates for the probability of
skipping school and in panel C the outcome variable is hours spent doing homework
per week. Though the effect of NPND on grades is positive for all groups except
17Due to space considerations, these tables are not shown in the paper but are available upon
request.
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females, none of the coeffi cients are statistically significant. Thus it seems that NPND
laws have no effect on academic performance.
In most states the law not only requires that the teenager be enrolled in school but
also enforces a minimum attendance requirement. Panel B shows results for equation
(2) where the outcome of interest is likelihood of skipping school. Teens who are in
states with the NPND law are 7 percentage point less likely to be truants and the effect
is significant at 5% (the coeffi cient is 0.018 while the mean for days skipped is 0.26).
Interestingly, when we compare columns (2) and (3), we find that the effect is larger
for females and insignificant for males.
A possible explanation for this result could be sample selection. The MTF only
records information for non-dropouts. In states with NPND laws, the sample includes
individuals who were at the margin for dropping out but decided not to because of the
fear of losing their driving privileges. We would expect these “marginal”students to
have a higher truancy rate. Note that, due to having only non-dropouts in the MTF,
selection is likely to be most pronounced for blacks since results from the ACS suggests
that blacks had the largest increase in graduation rates. Therefore, the coeffi cients are
underestimating the possible positive effect on blacks and should be a lower bound on
the actual estimates. If the bias due to selection is large enough, we might find that
there is no effect (or even negative) of NPND. This would be more true for blacks,
who are more disadvantaged, than for girls and that might be an explanation why the
coeffi cients are positive for girls and not for blacks.
Finally in panel C we study the effect on hours spent in doing homework. All
students, males and blacks are spending more time each week doing homework. In
particular, Blacks spend about 1 more hour doing homework each week and the result
is significant at 1%. This is a large effect relative to the average (5.74 hours) and
translates to a 17% increase in the average weekly time spent doing homework. We
also find that in a state with an NPND law, the average male spends 0.36 more hours
each week doing homework.
In Table 11, we present results for work-related outcomes. Panel A reports estimates
for probability of working while panel B shows results on hours spent working as the
dependent variable. The coeffi cient for each of the groups is close to zero in panel
A suggesting that NPND has no effect on a teenagers probability of employment.
However, we do find a decrease in hours spent on the job each week. The results are
strongest for males and blacks. In particular, males work about 0.15 hours less each
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week while blacks reduce hours of work by 0.2 hours in states with NPND laws. Both
estimates are highly statistically significant. There seems to be substitution going on
between work and study, however, we explore this further by looking at the effect on
leisure activities.
Table 12 reports estimates for the effect of NPND on leisure activities where leisure
is proxied by the number of times a teenager goes out every week on dates, parties and
hours spent watching television on an average weekday.18
MTF asks students “how often do you go out with a date?”The response categories
are: never; once a month or less; 2 or 3 times a month; once a week; 2 or 3 times a
week; over three times a week. Panel A shows ordered probit coeffi cients that take into
account the count nature of the variable.
The results suggest that students in NPND states decreased the frequency of go-
ing out on dates. The effect is largest for non-blacks and females and significant at
1%, while blacks are not decreasing their frequency of going out on dates. Panel B
shows ordered probit estimates for the frequency of going out for parties. None of the
estimates are significant at conventional levels of significance.
Finally, from Panel C, we observe that blacks in states with the NPND laws are
spending less time watching television on an average weekday. They spend 0.2 hours or
6 percent lesser hours each day watching TV and the effect is also highly statistically
significant at 1%.
To sum up, NPND laws led to a redistribution in allocation of time with respect to
work, study and leisure. In particular, blacks and males are spending more time doing
school work and less time working. Moreover, blacks, in states with NPND laws, are
spending less time watching television. Among women, there is an increase in school
attendance at the expense of leisure activities but not work. For the entire sample, we
find that in states with NPND laws, students are less likely to be truants, work less
hours, and go out less frequently on dates.19
18The MTF also reports a broad range of other leisure activities. We did not find any effect of
NPND on hours spent playing sports, going to the movies, playing videogames, going out with friends
or going to a mall.
19It is worth noting that because the sample only includes non-dropouts, the MTF results are
underestimating the true effects of the law.
21
4.4 Driving Outcomes
To further support our results, we also study the effect of NPND laws on driving
outcomes in the MTF. In these regressions, we also include 18 year olds in the sample
because driving-related questions are only asked to 12th graders.
Table 13, panel A, B and C, presents estimates for the effect of NPND laws on
“probability of holding a driving license”, “miles driven in a car per week”and “prob-
ability of having an accident in the last 12 months”respectively.20 The coeffi cients in
Panel B for driving are from an ordered probit model. The results indicate that all
groups except non-blacks have a high likelihood of holding a driving license with the
largest effect, 2 percent, among blacks. Moreover, in states with NPND laws, blacks
are driving more miles per week and are 4 percentage points less likely to have traffi c
accidents. We also find a negative coeffi cient on accidents for females, however, the
coeffi cient is much smaller in magnitude and is relatively imprecisely estimated.
It is not surprising that the effect of NPND laws on driving licenses and miles driven
is positive. If the law makes individuals stay in school, it is precisely because they have
a preference for driving. Thus, in states with NPND, those who are enrolled in school
have a strong preference for driving and are more likely to hold a license.
What is not clear is whether the effect on accidents can be interpreted as causal.
Theoretically, the mechanism through which education affects accidents can be com-
pared to the literature that measures the effect of education on negative externalities
with large social costs, such as crime. Lochner and Moretti (2004) show that an addi-
tional year of schooling is associated with a 0.37 percentage point reduction in incarcer-
ation for blacks. Comparably, if education increases one’s patience or risk aversion, we
should expect more educated individuals to be safer drivers. Thus, one interpretation
of these results is that NPND laws, indirectly through its effect on education, could
also have externality effects on accidents.21
However, another interpretation that is consistent with the results is that NPND
laws led to a decrease in the number of risky drivers on the roads. Individuals who
20We also studied the effect of NPND on some other driving related outcome variables in the MTF
dataset: driving under the influence of alcohol/drugs and seatbelt use. We do not find any significant
effects on these outcome variables. Tables are available upon request.
21We have also attempted to test this theory using the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS)
that maintains data regarding fatal injuries suffered in motor vehicle traffi c crashes in the US. Negative
binomial regression models of the effect of NPND law on state level accident fatalities among teenagers
using the data yielded negative but statistically insignificant results. However, this data is at the state
level and only includes accidents that led to a fatal outcome.
22
were not enrolled in school and/or were habitual truants would have lost their driving
privileges. Thus the negative effect on accidents could simply reflect the change in age
composition of drivers due to the smaller number of teen drivers on the roads. We
are not aware of any nationally representative dataset that has individual level data
on accidents, education and state level identifiers that allows us to test these different
interpretation of our driving results. We leave that for future research.
5 Discussion
Parents and educators use many discipline methods that involve carrots to tempt a
child to cooperate and behave well or alternately use sticks or threats to shape certain
behavior. The theoretical rationale behind using such approaches is that low-achieving
individuals have high discount rates and the use of carrots and sticks motivates them
to change their behavior. While social psychologists have long debated the effect of
incentives on intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, economists have recently begun eval-
uating numerous positive incentive policies. The main advantage of positive incentive
policies is that they are fairly easy to implement and they increase the set of choices
a child has and therefore it should not decrease their utility. However, they are costly
to administer and do not always seem to work for boys.
Negative incentive policies are not so popular among policy makers because they
decrease the choices available to children and the benefits might be short-run. More-
over, they are only effective if they target something that individuals have a preference
for. Also, there are ethical issues with conducting randomized controlled trials that
involve negative incentives. Nevertheless, parents and educators continue to use sticks
to discipline and motivate low performing children. For instance, grounding and time-
out are common approaches used by parents. Policy-makers across the world are also
increasingly making use of negative incentives to keep students from dropping out of
school. A recent Australian policy requires that teen parents be enrolled in school to
receive welfare payments.22 In the U.S., high school students who do not pass a certain
number of subjects are not allowed to play sports.
In this paper, we show that the No Pass No Drive (NPND) law, a U.S. state level
negative incentive policy, has positive and significant effect on educational attainment
22http://www.abc.net.au/news/2011-05-05/teen-parents-targeted-in-welfare-crackdown/2704204
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among affected cohorts and the effect is mainly driven by boys and blacks. Further, we
show that NPND laws were effective in reducing truancy and increased time allocated
to school-work at the expense of leisure and work.
While a formal cost benefit analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, it is easy to
see that the benefits of this policy far exceeds the costs. We find that NPND increases
educational attainment among blacks by 0.34 years and high school graduation rates
by 6.4%. Many estimates suggest that the private rate of return to a year of education
is 10 percent, or approximately $80,000 in present value over the course of a lifetime.
Using these numbers, 0.34 years more education would increases lifetime earnings by $
27,200. This is the direct private benefit of the policy and does not take into account
the social benefits in terms of reduced traffi c accidents, less teenagers who are drinking
and driving etc. Moreover, decreased truancy and more time spent doing school work
implies keeping students off the streets which can also have a more direct effect on
crime.
In terms of the costs to the government or taxpayers, the marginal cost of electronic
reporting is nearly zero and the fixed cost of setting up the system is minimal. However,
for students who are enrolled in school, we find a decrease in work hours in the MTF
data. Due to NPND laws, Blacks are working 0.2 hours less each week. Assuming that
an average high school student works upto 20 hours per week at a wage of $7.25 (Using
the Federal minimum wage), this implies a $1.45 decrease in average weekly wages for
the remaining years in school. This number is clearly small relative to the increase in
lifetime earnings. At the same time, some students who lose their driving privileges
because of poor attendance may no longer be able to drive to work. In this case, their
parents may drive them to work (which would cost the same except the time cost to
parents) or they might be compelled to take public transportation (which would be
cheaper than driving). However, we expect such costs to be negligible as most states
allow exemption for needy or constrained individuals including dropouts.
Thus, it is worth taking advantage of natural experiments to evaluate the intended
and unintended consequences of low-cost negative incentive policies. Negative incen-
tives, when not too extreme and when targeted towards an activity that students have
a preference for, might be an effective means to improve educational outcomes , espe-
cially among the disadvantaged groups.
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6 Appendix
Our main ACS specification excludes individuals between the age of 14 to 18. It
is possible that a 16 year old would have already got his driving license before the
enactment of the law. Thus, it is not clear how his education outcomes would be
affected by the NPND law. However, we can include these individuals in the sample
and test an alternative specification:
Eisc = β1Treatmentsc ∗ Y earsisc + β2Xisc + β3Rsc + S +B + εisc (3)
Where, Y earsisc is defined as the number of years the individual was exposed to
the policy. The interaction term Treatmentsc ∗ Y earsisc takes a value between 0 and
13. Assuming that school starts at age 6, someone who was only 6 year old when
the law was implemented would have been exposed to the NPND laws for 13 years
(Treatmentsc = 1 and Y earsisc = 13). On the other hand, if the individual was 17
when the law was enacted, he would have been exposed to the program for only two
years and thus, the interaction term would be equal to 2. The value of the interaction
term is equal to zero for those who were 19 and above when the law was implemented
(i.e. those with Treatment = 0). This specification includes all 26 states that had the
NPND laws in place at some point in the time period under study. All other control
variables are the same as in our main specification given by equation 1.
The results are shown in Table A1. An additional year of exposure to the NPND
law increases educational attainment by 0.01 years for the entire sample and by 0.014
years for males. Similarly, each additional year of exposure to the law increases the
likelihood of graduating from high school by 0.2%. Moreover, the effect is driven mainly
by males. All coeffi cients are highly statistically significant.
25
7 References
1. Angrist, J., and Krueger, Alan B. 1991. “Does Compulsory School Attendance
Affect Schooling and Earnings?,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT
Press, vol. 106(4), pages 979-1014, November.
2. Angrist, J., Lang D. and P. Oreopoulos. 2009. “Incentives and Services for
College Achievement: Evidence from a Randomized Trial.”American Economic
Journal: Applied Economics, 1(1): 136-63.
3. Angrist, J. and V. Lavy. 2009. “The Effects of High Stakes High School Achieve-
ment Awards: Evidence from a Group Randomized Trial.”American Economic
Review, 99(4): 1384-14.
4. Barua, R. & K. Lang. 2010. “School Entry, Educational Attainment and Quarter
of Birth: A Cautionary Tale of LATE.”NBER Working Papers 15236.
5. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 2000. “Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the
Incidence of Endogenous Policies.”Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society,
vol. 110(467), pages F672-94, November.
6. Bettinger, Eric P. 2010. “Paying to Learn: The Effect of Financial Incentives on
Elementary School Test Scores.”NBER Working paper 16333.
7. Berry, Jim. 2009. “Child Control in Education Decisions: An Evaluation of
Targeted Incentives to Learn in India.”Working Paper.
8. Bertrand, M., Duflo E. & S. Mullainathan. 2004. “How Much Should We Trust
Differences-in-Differences Estimates?.”The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT
Press, vol. 119(1), pages 249-275, February.
9. Bridgeland, J. M., DiIulio, Jr., J. J., &Morison, K. B. 2006. “The silent epidemic:
Perspectives of high school dropouts.”Washington, DC: Civic Enterprises.
10. Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. 1999. “A meta-analytic review of
experiments examining the effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation.”
Psychological Bulletin, 125, 627-668.
11. Frey, Bruno S & Jegen, Reto, 2001. “Motivation Crowding Theory.”Journal of
Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(5), pages 589-611, December.
26
12. Fryer, Roland G. 2010. “Financial Incentives and Student Achievement: Evi-
dence from Randomized Trials.”NBER Working paper 15898.
13. Gneezy, Uri, Stephan Meier, and Pedro Rey-Biel. 2011. "When and Why In-
centives (Don’t) Work to Modify Behavior." Journal of Economic Perspectives,
25(4): 191—210.
14. Heckman, James J & Paul A LaFontaine, 2010. “The American High School
Graduation Rate: Trends and Levels.”The Review of Economics and Statistics,
MIT Press, vol. 92(2), pages 244-262, 01.
15. Kremer, M., E. Miguel and R. Thornton. 2009. “Incentives to Learn.”Review
of Economics and Statistics, 91(3): 437—56.
16. Leuven, E., H. Oosterbeek, and Bas van der Klaauw. 2010. “The effect of finan-
cial rewards on students achievement: Evidence from a randomized experiment.”
Journal of the European Economic Association 8(6), 1243—1265.
17. Lindo, J.M, Nicholas J. Sanders and Philip Oreopoulos. 2010. “Ability, Gender,
and Performance Standards: Evidence from Academic Probation.” American
Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2 (2): 95-117.
18. Lochner, L., and Moretti, E. 2004. “The Effect of Education on Crime: Evidence
from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports.”American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 155-189, March.
19. Vidal-Fernandez, M. 2011. “The Effect of Minimum Academic Requirements to
Participate in Sports on High School Graduation.”The B.E. Journal of Economic
Analysis & Policy: Vol. 11 (1), Article 51
20. U.S. Department of Education. “State Comparisons of Education Statistics:
1969-70 to 1996-97.”NCES 98-018, Washington DC: 1998
21. U.S. Department of Education, Digest of Education Statistics, National Center
for Education Statistics. 2009, 2010
27
Figure 1: States with No Pass No Drive Laws (2008)
Table 1: Summary of No Pass No Drive Laws in 2008

























































































































Cohort 1960 1970 1980 All
Educational attainment 13.49 13.71 13.37 13.48
(2.10) (2.05) (1.91) (2.03)
Males 13.36 13.49 13.14 13.29
(2.18) (2.12) (1.96) (2.10)
Females 13.62 13.91 13.60 13.66
(2.02) (1.95) (1.84) (1.94)
Black 12.93 13.08 12.75 12.88
(2.28) (2.22) (2.11) (2.21)
White 13.58 13.81 13.49 13.59
(2.05) (1.98) (1.84) (1.97)
High school graduation 0.87 0.88 0.86 0.87
(0.33) (0.33) (0.35) (0.34)
Males 0.85 0.85 0.83 0.84
(0.35) (0.36) (0.38) (0.36)
Females 0.90 0.91 0.89 0.90
(0.31) (0.29) (0.31) (0.30)
Black 0.81 0.80 0.77 0.79
(0.39) (0.40) (0.42) (0.41)
White 0.89 0.89 0.88 0.89
(0.32) (0.31) (0.33) (0.32)
Males 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.49
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Blacks 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11
(0.31) (0.32) (0.33) (0.32)
Lives in a SMSA 0.77 0.79 0.80 0.78
(0.42) (0.41) (0.40) (0.41)
Observations 356,371 287,352 297,661 1.059,305
State-specific Economic Variables
Cohort 1960 1970 1980 All
Log (Per capita income) 8.94 9.70 10.12 9.50
(0.30) (0.21) (0.18) (0.65)
Log (Population) 15.69 15.78 15.94 15.79
(0.88) (0.89) (0.92) (0.90)
Unemployment rate 6.99 6.99 5.24 6.36
(2.18) (2.05) (1.31) (2.02)
State-specific Education Variables
Cohort 1960 1970 1980 All
Log (Expenditure/pupil) 7.98 8.21 8.79 8.30
(0.23) (0.25) (0.39) (0.48)
Pupil teacher ratio 19.84 17.80 16.87 18.50
(1.99) (2.47) (2.63) (2.84)
Log (Teacher salary) 10.03 10.09 10.12 10.08
(0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Salaries and expenditures are inflation-adjusted.
Educational attainment is in years.
Table 2: ACS 2009  Descriptive Statistics by Cohort
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All Males Females Blacks Non-blacks
Education Outcomes
                           Grade Point Average (GPA) 6.03 5.78 6.30 5.80 6.1
(2.18) (2.21) (2.11) (2.13) (2.1)
                           Truancy 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.33 0.23
(0.44) (0.43) (0.42) (0.47) (0.42)
                           Hours doing homework per week 6.85 6.25 7.45 5.74 7.06
(6.40) (6.08) (6.65) (6.03) (6.45)
Employment Outcomes
                           Work 0.50 0.51 0.47 0.52 0.48
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.81) (0.50)
                           Hours worked a day 2.50 2.61 2.39 2.71 2.44
(2.05) (2.13) (1.97) (2.24) (2.00)
Leisure Activities
                           Going out on dates 2.57 2.59 2.55 2.58 2.57
(1.59) (1.56) (1.62) (1.60) (1.59)
                           Going out for parties 3.11 3.08 3.13 3.09 3.11
(0.95) (0.98) (0.91) (1.01) (0.94)
                           Hours watching TV on weekday 2.54 2.62 2.46 3.56 2.38
(1.54) (1.53) (1.54) (1.50) (1.48)
Age 16.5 16.48 16.51 16.65 15.91
(0.85) (0.83) (0.86) (1.76) (1.67)
Lives in a Statistical Metropolitan Area 0.77 0.76 0.77 0.80 0.75
(0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.4) (0.43)
Max. parent's education  some high school 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.05
(0.23) (0.22) (0.25) (0.22) (0.22)
                                   High school graduate 0.22 0.21 0.22 0.20 0.21
(0.41) (0.41) (0.42) (0.4) (0.41)
                                   Some college 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.18 0.17
(0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4) (0.38)
                                   College graduate 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.25 0.3
(0.47) (0.47) (0.49) (0.43) (0.46)
                                   More than college 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.26 0.18
(0.39) (0.39) (0.39) (0.43) (0.39)
Observations 914,910 425,509 452,250 215,455 699,455
Weighted statistics
The GPA variable is recoded as D=1, C - =2, and so on up to A=9.
Going out for dates & party are the average nights a week a student goes out at night/party and ranges from zero to three or more
                              Table 3: Monitoring the Future Descriptive Statistics
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Males Only Females Only
Treatment -0.030*** 0.011*** 0.009** 0.010* 0.008**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)
Male -0.051***
(0.002)
White 0.063*** 0.070*** 0.057***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Black -0.026*** -0.054*** -0.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Metropolitan Status 0.066*** 0.082*** 0.048***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Pupil teacher ratio -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log (Teacher Salary) 0.004 -0.003 0.011
(0.014) (0.019) (0.019)
Log (Expenditure/pupil) 0.016 0.013 0.018
(0.016) (0.021) (0.015)
State of birth ü ü ü ü
Year of birth ü ü ü ü
Observations 987654 987654 905166 445345 459821
Standard errors clustered at the state level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Columns (3)-(5) include unemployment rate, log (per capita income) and log (population)
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
Table 4: The Effect of NPND Law on High School Graduation (ACS 2009)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Males Only Females Only
Treatment -0.127*** 0.001 0.036 0.061* 0.011
(0.008) (0.021) (0.025) (0.031) (0.025)
Male -0.342***
(0.012)
White 0.426*** 0.443*** 0.408***
(0.056) (0.058) (0.057)
Black -0.324*** -0.466*** -0.197***
(0.066) (0.071) (0.063)
Metropolitan status 0.733*** 0.843*** 0.619***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.023)
Pupil teacher ratio -0.014*** -0.014** -0.014**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Log (Teacher Salary) 0.188 0.117 0.251
(0.131) (0.132) (0.155)
Log (Expenditure/pupil) 0.122 0.134 0.113
(0.103) (0.123) (0.111)
State of birth ü ü ü ü
Year of birth ü ü ü ü
Observations 839643 839643 768475 376352 392123
Standard errors clustered at the state level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Columns (3)-(5) include unemployment rate, log (per capita income) and log (population)
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
Educational attainment is in years.
 Table 5: The Effect of NPND Law on Educational Attainment (ACS 2009)
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attainment All Attainment Males Attainment Females Graduation All Graduation Males Graduation Females
Treatment 0.054** 0.091*** 0.019 0.010* 0.015** 0.005
(0.024) (0.032) (0.027) (0.005) (0.008) (0.005)
Male -0.342*** -0.051***
(0.012) (0.002)
White 0.422*** 0.438*** 0.404*** 0.063*** 0.070*** 0.057***
(0.056) (0.058) (0.057) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Black -0.326*** -0.469*** -0.198*** -0.026*** -0.053*** -0.000
(0.066) (0.072) (0.063) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Metropolitan Status 0.733*** 0.843*** 0.619*** 0.066*** 0.082*** 0.049***
(0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Pupil teacher ratio -0.009* -0.007 -0.010 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Log (Teacher Salary) 0.283*** 0.213* 0.354*** 0.022** 0.016 0.030*
(0.090) (0.108) (0.102) (0.010) (0.019) (0.016)
Log (Expenditure/pupil) -0.032 -0.032 -0.037 -0.006 -0.002 -0.010
(0.074) (0.087) (0.105) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014)
Observations 768475 376352 392123 905166 445345 459821
Standard errors clustered at the state level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include state and cohort dummies, state-specific linear time trends, unemployment rate, log (per capita income) and log (population)
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
Educational attainment is in years.
      Table 6: Effect of NPND Laws on Educational Attainment and High School Graduation with State-specific Time Trends (ACS 2009)
                                             Table 7: Effect of NPND Laws on Education by Race (Males Only)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Attainment Blacks Attainment Whites Graduation Blacks Graduation Whites
Treatment 0.344*** 0.039 0.051*** 0.004
-0.064 -0.036 -0.018 -0.007
Observations 40693 313414 49647 365861
Standard errors clustered at the state level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include state and cohort dummies, state-specific linear time trends, SMSA, unemployment rate, log (per capita income)
log (population), log (teacher salaries), log (expenditures per pupil), and pupil per teacher ratio
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
Educational attainment is in years.
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Panel A : Males Only
Treatment 0.091*** 0.015** 0.079** 0.018** 0.094*** 0.014* 0.003 -0.002
(0.032) (0.008) (0.035) (0.008) (0.033) (0.007) (0.031) (0.006)
Entry Age Laws/Attendance Laws -0.013 0.001 -0.010 0.005***
(0.011) (0.002) (0.012) (0.002)
Observations 376352 445345 301374 356592 373149 441451 80545 80545
 Panel B:  Black Males
Treatment 0.344*** 0.051*** 0.414*** 0.074*** 0.349*** 0.051*** -0.127 -0.009
-0.064 -0.018 (0.075) (0.017) (0.066) (0.017) (0.108) (0.011)
Entry Age Laws/Attendance Laws 0.017 0.005 -0.012 0.006
(0.031) (0.008) (0.023) (0.004)
Observations 40693 49647 33785 41608 40575 49500 10376 10376
Standard errors clustered at the state level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include state and cohort dummies, state-specific linear time trends, SMSA, unemployment rate, log (per capita income), log (population), log (teacher salaries),
log (expenditures per pupil), and pupil per teacher ratio
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
Educational attainment is in years.
Table 8: Effect of NPND Laws on Education: Robustness Checks for Males and Blacks (ACS 2009)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attainment All Attainment Males Attainment Blacks Graduation All Graduation Males Graduation Blacks
Treatment 0.055** 0.104*** 0.444*** 0.013*** 0.023*** 0.080***
(0.025) (0.034) (0.081) (0.005) (0.007) (0.016)
Log (Vehicle miles) 0.009 0.029 -0.018 -0.001 -0.002 -0.014*
(0.018) (0.023) (0.093) (0.002) (0.003) (0.007)
Log (Traffic fatalities) -0.035 -0.040 -0.030 -0.005 -0.010* -0.021
(0.029) (0.044) (0.123) (0.004) (0.006) (0.015)
Observations 621813 305081 33477 758504 374074 42431
Standard errors clustered at the state level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include state and cohort dummies, state-specific linear time trends, SMSA, unemployment rate, log (per capita income)
log (population), log (teacher salaries), log (expenditures per pupil), and pupil per teacher ratio
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
Educational attainment is in years.
Table 9: Effect of NPND Laws on Education Controlling for Traffic Variables
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Male Female Black Non-Blacks
Panel A: Grades
NPND 0.024 0.077 -0.022 0.028 0.011
(0.047) (0.060) (0.053) (0.093) (0.054)
Observations 355,541 165,814 189,727 66,636 288,905
Panel B:  Probability of Sk ipping School
NPND -0.018** -0.015 -0.020** -0.020 -0.016*
(0.009) (0.011) (0.009) (0.017) (0.010)
Observations 362,458 169,479 192,979 69,269 293,189
Panel C:  Hours Spent Doing Homework  a Da y
NPND 0.197** 0.359** 0.062 0.964*** -0.070
(0.158) (0.161) (0.215) (0.223) (0.181)
Observations 261,414 126,462 134,952 40,773 220,641
Standard errors clustered at the state level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include SMSA, unemployment rate, log(per capita income), log (population),
log(teacher salaries), log(expenditures per pupil), pupil per teacher ratio, log(traffic fatalities),
log(vehicle miles), year & state dummies, and state-specific time trends
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
The grade variable is recoded as D=1, C - =2, and so on up to A=9.
Panel B shows estimates from a linear probability model
Table 10: Effect of NPND Laws on Grades, Skipping Classes, and  Homework
                    Table 11: Effect of NPND Laws on Employment Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Male Female Black Non-Blacks
Panel A:  Probability of Work ing
NPND -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.024 -0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.017) (0.010)
Observations 362,458 169,479 192,979 69,269 293,189
Panel B: Hours Worked a Day
NPND -0.105** -0.145*** -0.077 -0.180*** -0.074
(0.047) (0.054) (0.065) (0.064) (0.059)
Observations 178,840 84,783 94,057 31,689 147,151
Standard errors clustered at the state level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include SMSA, unemployment rate, log(per capita income), log (population),
log(teacher salaries), log(expenditures per pupil), pupil per teacher ratio, log(traffic fatalities),
log(vehicle miles), year & state dummies, and state-specific time trends
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
Panel A shows estimates from a linear probability model
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                          Table 12: Effect of NPND Laws on Leisure Activities
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Male Female Black Non-Blacks
Panel A:  Going out on a Date
NPND -0.067*** -0.052* -0.079*** -0.027 -0.081***
(0.023) (0.031) (0.027) (0.030) (0.028)
Observations 356,314 165,122 191,192 65,343 290,971
Panel B: Going out for Parties
NPND -0.023 0.031 -0.063 -0.015 -0.025
(0.029) (0.026) (0.041) (0.033) (0.030)
Observations 291,930 140,297 151,633 47,974 243,956
Panel C:  Watching Television
NPND -0.030 -0.017 -0.043 -0.194*** 0.022
(0.033) (0.039) (0.037) (0.063) (0.034)
Observations 265,405 128,303 137,102 42,182 223,223
Standard errors clustered at the state level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include SMSA, unemployment rate, log(per capita income), log (population),
log(teacher salaries), log(expenditures per pupil), pupil per teacher ratio, log(traffic fatalities),
log(vehicle miles), year & state dummies, and state-specific time trends
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
The estimated coefficients in Panel A and B are from an ordered probit regression
                       Table 13: Effect of NPND Laws on Driving and Accidents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Male Female Black Non-Blacks
Panel A: License
NPND 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.005** 0.019*** 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Observations 731,960 347,990 383,970 144,997 586,963
Panel B: Miles Driven
NPND 0.018 0.025 0.009 0.108*** -0.009
(0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.036) (0.027)
Observations 234,998 106,625 128,373 47,363 187,635
Panel C:  Accidents
NPND -0.016 -0.014 -0.018* -0.041** -0.007
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.020) (0.011)
Observations 731,960 347,990 383,970 144,997 586,963
Standard errors clustered at the state level.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include SMSA, unemployment rate, log(per capita income), log (population),
log(teacher salaries), log(expenditures per pupil), pupil per teacher ratio, log(traffic fatalities),
log(vehicle miles), year & state dummies, and state-specific time trends
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
Panel A and C shows estimates from a linear probability model, where Y=1 if individual
 has a license or suffered a traffic accident within the last year.
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 Table A1: Effect of Years Exposed to NPND Laws on Educational Attainment and High School Graduation (ACS 2009)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attainment All Attainment Males Attainment Females Graduation All Graduation Males Graduation Females
Number of Years
Exposed to NPND 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.007 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001
(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Observations 402618 196666 205952 479707 235628 244079
Standard errors clustered at the state level
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
All regressions include SMSA, unemployment rate, log(per capita income), log (population), log(teacher salaries), log(expenditures per pupil),
pupil per teacher ratio, log(traffic fatalities), log(vehicle miles), year & state dummies, and state-specific time trends
Expenditures, salaries, and income are inflation-adjusted.
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